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 The year 2016 was an election year in Peru. 
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, commonly abbreviated 
to PPK, became president by a narrow margin, 
running for the center-right party Peruvians 
for Change. However, only 20 percent of 
Peruvians can identify the president’s party. In 
Peru, politics is a profoundly personal endeavor 
where parties merely serve as vehicles for 
candidates to reach office and have short life 
spans. Peruvians for Change was founded in 
October 2014, and it is likely that it will suffer 
the same fate as other political parties and not 
outlive their leader’s political career. The past 
five presidents have all come from different 
political parties, and none of them has won 
reelection. In many cases the party fades away 
as soon as the president falls out of favor.
 In this article, I analyze Peru’s political 
system, shedding light on the compromising 
effect it has on Peru’s democracy as well as 
possible paths toward establishing a stronger 
party system. This unique challenge is a direct 
result of the presidency of Alberto Fujimori 
from 1990 to 2000. Viewed as both hero and 
tyrant, he is a polarizing figure in Peru’s past 
who left in his wake a broken and ineffective 
political system. Not much has changed since 
his impeachment and later imprisonment, but 
the election of 2016 may hold clues that the 
political tides are finally beginning to change.
Peru’s Tumultuous Political History
 Typically, when a country has sustained 
economic growth and limited civil unrest, 
the government is viewed favorably by its 
citizens. Not so in Peru. Despite the past 25 
years of economic success and relative peace, 
Transparency International consistently ranks 
Peru last in Latin America for perception of 
both how well the government represents 
the peoples’ views and how corrupt it is 
(“Corruption Perceptions Index: Peru”). In 
short, Peruvians believe that their government 
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is failing them and is hopelessly corrupt. How 
did this public relations nightmare come to be? 
The current state of government mistrust that 
is pervasive in Peruvian society today has been 
shaped by the country’s tumultuous political 
history (Levitsky).
 In the early twentieth century, Peru was 
an ex-Spanish colony trying to sustain a stable 
democracy while relying on exporting silver 
and guano to build its economy. The growth 
was steady until the 1960s, when a democracy’s 
worst fear occurred: General Jaun Velasco 
staged a military coup and became dictator. 
General Velasco did not know how to run a 
nation’s economy, and he instituted untested 
land reform measures and nationalized most of 
the large mining companies in Peru. These ill-
advised actions led to an immediate economic 
downturn that persisted throughout the series 
of military takeovers and rigged elections that 
followed (“Peru Historical…”).
 In 1980 the Maoist terrorist organization 
Sendero Luminoso, or the Shining Path, 
sabotaged the first election in 17 years by 
burning all the ballots. To achieve its goals, 
the leader of the Shining Path, Abimael 
Guzmán, authorized hyper-violent guerrilla 
warfare tactics (Jasper and Seelke, p. 2). The 
Shining Path first took up residence in the 
Andean regions of Peru, where its strict rules 
and harsh punishments brought much needed 
stability to the farmers and herders who had 
lived without any law enforcement since the 
military revolutions of the 1960s. The Shining 
Path then began to spread into the capital of 
Lima, where it sabotaged infrastructure and 
indiscriminately killed non-supporters. The 
government gave increasingly unilateral power 
to its police to combat the Shining Path, 
including the ability to detain and question 
anyone without cause. Government efforts 
were mostly unsuccessful, however, leaving 
the country in a constant state of fear and 
turmoil at the start of the 1990 election (“Peru 
Historical…”).
 Democracies that have widespread public 
unrest and national security concerns are 
uniquely vulnerable to dictatorship (Jasper and 
Seelke, p. 2). Increasing fear of terrorism and 
economic distress caused Peruvians to turn to 
an untested leader whose aspirations they did 
not fully understand. Alberto Fujimori was a 
Japanese-Peruvian university professor who 
burst onto the political scene in 1990 running 
on an anti-terrorism campaign. He won the 
presidency and immediately implemented his 
“Fujishock” plan, which consisted of a series 
of free-market reforms to combat the nation’s 
hyperinflation. He also prioritized the defeat of 
the Shining Path over the rights of Peruvian 
citizens and granted immense power to his 
chief of secret police, Vladimiro Montesinos. 
In 1992 Fujimori’s popularity skyrocketed 
after Guzmán was captured. Riding this wave 
of support in 1993, Fujimori disbanded the 
government and re-wrote the constitution 
(“Peru Historical…”). He asserted that he 
was making the democracy of Peru stronger, 
claiming his action was “not a negation of real 
democracy, but on the contrary… a search 
for an authentic transformation to assure a 
legitimate and effective democracy” (as quoted 
in Smith, p. 236). His reforms seemed to be 
effective, as Peru’s economy became the fastest 
growing in the world during his presidency, 
with an annual GDP increase of 12 percent 
(Brooke). He easily won reelection in 1995 
despite accusations of bribery and controlling 
the media. The Peruvian constitution at that 
time allowed presidents to have only two terms 
in office, yet Fujimori ran for a third in 2000, 
arguing that it would be only his second term 
under the new constitution. Accounts of gross 
human rights violations by the secret police 
began to surface, causing Fujimori to barely win 
reelection under suspect circumstances. Shortly 
thereafter, incontrovertible evidence emerged 
that Fujimori engaged in embezzlement, bribes, 
and other corrupt practices. He fled to Japan in 
January 2000 and tried to resign, but Congress 
impeached him instead. Fujimori stayed in 
Japan for five years until 2005, when he traveled 
to Chile in an effort to restart his political career. 
He was arrested in Chile and extradited to Peru. 
He was eventually convicted of human rights 
violations and sentenced to 25 years in prison 
(“Peru Historical…”).
 From 2000 to the present, Peru has 
maintained a weak democracy and stayed the 
course of Fujimori’s macroeconomic policy, 
continuing the economic growth that began 
with his presidency (Santos and Werner, p. 
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19). Fujimori is a deeply controversial figure 
in Peruvians’ minds and the source of most of 
the distrust of the government. The presidents 
following Fujimori have not been popular, and 
the ones before him were military dictators. 
He is widely believed to have steered the 
Peruvian economy onto the right track and to 
have ended the reign of terror of the Shining 
Path, although his contribution to both 
accomplishments and the means he used are 
hotly debated (Horler). He is also remembered 
for his authoritarian regime and corrupt 
administration. The only politician who can be 
plausibly credited with saving the country is 
currently in prison. Peruvians’ cynicism with 
regard to their government can be attributed 
to the controversial rise and fall of Fujimori.
 Mistrust of politicians has been a barrier 
to the formation of modern political parties 
in Peru. Political parties have tended to have 
short life spans, with the two most common 
ideologies Fujimorismo and its opposite anti-
Fujimorismo. The former ideology is in favor of 
Fujimori’s economic and political tactics, while 
the latter is fiercely opposed. Although political 
parties themselves form and disband quickly, 
these two worldviews are always the focal point 
of any debate (Levitsky and Cameron, p. 22). 
Peru’s 2016 Presidential Election
 The presidential election of 2016 took 
place in two phases. First, a vote was held in 
April to select two finalists from a plethora of 
candidates running with the support of the 
diverse political parties in Peru. None other 
than Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of the now-
imprisoned Alberto Fujimori, ran for president 
and won the first election in April with roughly 
40 percent of the vote. Also making it to the 
run-off election was PPK, a respected financier. 
Keiko Fujimori ran on the ticket of the 
Popular Force party and PPK represented the 
Peruvians for Change party. The two finalists 
then competed head-to-head in a June run-off 
election to determine the next president. Keiko 
Fujimori was ahead in the polls for most of the 
lead up to the June 5th election date, but PPK 
narrowly defeated her by the miniscule margin 
of 50.1 percent to 49.9 percent. This surprising 
upset of Keiko was attributed to a series of 
scandals involving the senior members of 
her party, including news that Congressman 
Joaquín Ramírez was under investigation by 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
for connections to drug trafficking. PPK had 
repeatedly cautioned the electorate that the 
corruption and abuses of power associated 
with Keiko’s father’s authoritarian reign would 
return should she be elected. Additionally, 
a reluctant last-minute endorsement by 
Verónika Mendoza, the third-place finisher 
in the first round of elections and champion 
of the leftist Broad Front party, may have put 
PPK over the top by helping her voters choose 
between the conservative candidates. Mendoza 
told her supporters that PPK was the lesser of 
two evils, saying, “Only by voting for Kuczynski 
can we close the path towards Fujimorismo” 
(as quoted in Wang). 
 Keiko has reluctantly accepted these 
results, saying that she was defeated by 
“promoters of hate” (as quoted in “Peru 
Elections…”). She promises to continue to 
work on her political agenda through the 
legislative branch, where her party controls 
73 of the 130 seats in Congress. PPK’s party, 
Peruvians for Change, holds 18 seats (Post). 
It was founded as recently as October 2014. 
The few seats that the party holds in Congress 
indicate that PPK’s victory in the presidential 
election was more due to the strength of the 
anti-Fujimorismo ideology than the strength 
of his own party. 
 Popular Force, the Fujimorismo party, is 
the closest thing that Peru has to a modern 
political party. It has existed since the downfall 
of Alberto Fujimori. Its newfound majority 
in Congress allows it to make political 
moves despite its loss in the presidential race 
(Horler). Seat allocation in Peruvian Congress 
follows the d’Hondt method for proportional 
representation, which stipulates that a party 
must have above five percent support to win 
any seats in Congress. The result is that most 
of the seats that would go to the smaller parties 
are instead allocated to the largest party, in 
this instance Popular Force (Carey, p. 3). 
The d’Hondt method has long been criticized 
for awarding huge seat bonuses to already 
established parties (Taagepera and Shugart, 
pp. 86–87). Had Peru employed a directly 
proportional representation system, Popular 
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Force would have won 53 seats in Congress, 
which would be a small plurality. Then PPK 
could have made alliances with the smaller 
parties to get the necessary votes to move 
his economic and social plan forward. Under 
the current government, if he wants to pass 
anything through Congress he will have to 
compromise with Keiko. Some of her more 
controversial stances and areas where PPK 
may have to accommodate her are freeing her 
father from prison, supporting illegal mining 
in the Amazon, and increasing powers of police 
in the fringe regions of Peru (Wang).
Importance of Political Parties
 Established political parties serve several 
key functions in a democracy. They help the 
electorate determine what a candidate’s stances 
are on each issue. Instead of painstakingly 
learning about each politician, voters can 
use the party platforms and reputations to 
decide whom they want to elect. Parties 
provide a shortcut to voters, who can now 
feel confident that they know what to expect 
from any given candidate based on his party 
affiliations (Dargent and Muñoz, pp. 48–49). 
In the absence of political parties, becoming 
an educated voter is infinitely more difficult. 
Sifting through the often unofficial stances 
of a plethora of independent or new party 
candidates is frustrating and inefficient. Voters 
have no past experiences with a party on 
which to base their expectations. People may 
quickly become disillusioned with this political 
chore and develop pessimistic attitudes 
toward government in general. This distrust 
of government is exactly what is observed in 
Peru.
 Another key aspect of political parties 
is that they make democracy viable for the 
politicians as well. Politicians’ most important 
goal is to be reelected. This makes them 
inherently short-sighted with policies, rarely 
planning beyond the next election cycle. 
Politicians are especially bad at taking short-
term risks for long-term rewards because they 
might not be around when the investment 
finally pays off (Tanaka, p. 56). Political parties, 
on the other hand, last beyond individual 
elections and thus are better equipped to plan 
long-term policy. The obvious caveat to this 
benefit of political parties is that they must 
actually last longer than any single politician. 
The problem in Peru is that parties are so 
short-lived that they cannot plan future policy 
any better than politicians.
 Parties also provide an avenue for social 
unrest to be addressed. The two greatest threats 
to a democracy’s stability are a fearful economic 
elite and an angry worker class. Powerful 
socioeconomic players do anything to protect 
their business interests. This means that if 
their wishes are not effectively represented 
in the current government, they will turn to 
other non-democratic alternatives (Levitsky 
and Cameron, pp. 3-4). They can support 
military takeovers and appoint figureheads 
to keep their assets safe. Thus, for example, 
a strong right-wing party is an important 
element of a democracy. It provides business 
owners with a delivery system for their ideas 
within the existing democracy. Additionally, a 
strong labor-based party can help protect the 
rights of the working class. A labor party is able 
to pass reforms and make workers feel that 
their government is looking out for them. This 
alleviates tension and helps prevent extreme 
actions like strikes and revolutions (Dargent 
and Muñoz, p. 52).
 Another way that political parties protect 
democracy is by facilitating the system of checks 
and balances to limit the power of the executive 
branch. In most countries, the executive 
branch is the most prone to corruption and 
authoritarian leanings. The large amount of 
power consolidated in one individual makes 
it a common area of democratic deviance. 
The legislature must fulfill its oversight duty 
and quickly strike down an action or impeach 
a president who begins to abuse his power 
(Levitsky and Cameron, p. 3). The presence 
of organized and watchful political parties 
allows the legislature to take action much 
faster than if it were composed of unorganized 
and disconnected independents. In case the 
legislative branch fails, the parties can rally 
their faithful members and trigger public 
outcry to combat the executive’s actions. 
 It is also much harder for inexperienced 
and unqualified politicians to get elected 
when political parties are strong. Parties 
serve as gatekeepers to public offices, helping 
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qualified and vetted politicians get elected. 
When positions in government are filled by 
members of established parties, there are fewer 
opportunities for amateur politicians to be 
elected. Partisan politicians are not flawless, 
but outsiders are far more likely to sabotage 
the democratic process. They often have no 
training in the rules of government and do 
not value democratic institutions. They have 
trouble compromising to form alliances with 
other policy makers and resort to strong-arm 
tactics and overt threats (Tanaka, p. 58). These 
unpredictable leaders are not beholden to 
any outside organizations and act recklessly. 
Democracies are much more stable when 
parties filter the candidates down to those who 
share their core values, one of which is the 
preservation of democracy in the first place.
Destruction of Peru’s Political Parties
 Peru has experienced the danger of political 
outsiders firsthand. Alberto Fujimori was not 
a politician, but rather a university professor. 
The inner workings of government revolve 
around negotiation and compromise. These 
are topics that may be foreign to a professor 
without experience navigating the political 
system. Fujimori quickly became frustrated 
when the implementation of his national policy 
was much harder to enact than he expected 
(“Peru Historical…”). Having no ties to the 
system of governance, he had no qualms about 
voiding the constitution and replacing it with 
one more suitable for his vision.
 Fujimori was not just a symptom of a 
democracy lacking political parties, but he 
was also the cause leading to modern parties’ 
difficulty in becoming established today. Early 
in his presidency, he was extremely popular. 
The defeat of the Shining Path and the control 
of hyperinflation made his approval rating rise 
to 66 percent and earned him some leeway with 
the people for his unconventional authoritarian 
style. This early success popularized the idea 
of independent candidates because Fujimori 
himself had run as an independent candidate. 
The Peruvian people began to internalize 
Fujimori’s arguments in favor of amateur 
politicians. There are several familiar talking 
points that are brought up any time political 
outsiders run for office. These often charismatic 
candidates usually claim that they are not 
career politicians; they are simply concerned 
citizens. They apply their business acumen and 
fix the discord in government. They are not 
beholden to any corporate or party interests. 
These claims are consistently used to great 
effect by amateur politicians, and Fujimori 
was no exception. The Peruvian people saw 
what an effective leader Fujimori was initially, 
although many of his accomplishments were 
due to his circumnavigating the democratic 
process rather than working through it. They 
then latched onto the mentality that outsiders 
are preferable to politicians.
 The newfound distrust of politicians led 
to a large-scale exodus from the few political 
parties of the time. Candidates realized the 
stigma that was now attached to political 
parties and sought to re-brand themselves 
as independents. An example of this was the 
longtime member of the center-right Christian 
People’s Party, Alberto Andrade, who defected 
to become an independent in order to run 
for mayor of Lima in 1995 while famously 
saying, “No candidate affiliated with a party 
had a chance of winning the mayorality of 
Lima” (as quoted in “Levitsky and Cameron, 
p. 11”). Andrade’s strategy was successful, and 
he won the election. This laid the blueprint 
for other politicians, and almost overnight 
the established political parties melted away. 
This had the unintended consequence of 
also destroying any accountability that the 
legislature could have on Fujimori. 
 Without parties to unify the Peruvian 
Congress, its members were uncoordinated 
and unprepared to act as a check on Fujimori’s 
executive power. The people took notice of this 
also. Near the end of Fujimori’s presidency, as 
the corruption became more apparent, cries 
surfaced for the old parties in Congress to take 
action to curb his power. At this point it was far 
too late, and the few remaining members loyal 
to the political establishment were unable to 
do anything. Fujimori’s regime eventually did 
collapse, but its demise was a self-destruction 
and had nothing to do with outside resistance. 
The powerlessness of political parties to 
stop Fujimori is remembered to this day, 
and Peruvians do not see political parties as 
a safeguard to democracy. After Fujimori’s 
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resignation in 2001, an emergency election 
had to be held to elect a new president. 
Despite the near collapse of democracy that 
ensued from the last political outsider they 
elected, Peruvians chose Alejandro Toledo, 
an amateur politician who, like Fujimori, 
had never held public office. The failures of 
established political channels to stop Fujimori 
were fresh in the peoples’ minds, and another 
independent seemed preferable. It is this legacy 
of mistrust that persists today and hinders the 
establishment of lasting political parties in 
Peru.
Party-forming Problems and Policies
 In countries with established political 
parties, when a new issue arises (such as an 
impending war or negotiations with labor 
unions) the parties gauge the public’s opinion 
and choose sides. But in Peru parties are often 
based around a single issue and may not take 
a stance when a new problem presents itself. 
Sometimes an entirely new party forms with 
the emerging dispute as its center point. In 
contrast, the mark of a strong political party 
is that it can adapt to changing circumstances 
and persist throughout many elections. In the 
previous section I enumerated the benefits of 
strong political parties to a democracy, but 
what can Peru do to help establish parties? In 
this section I explain the party-building process 
and evaluate Peru’s available options.
 The first issue to contend with is the 
very real possibility that Peruvian politicians 
simply do not want more-established parties. 
The elected officials in power have managed 
to succeed under the current party-less 
atmosphere and thus may be comfortable 
with the status quo. Additionally, many of 
these politicians founded their own parties as 
candidate-centered vehicles just before their 
elections, thus avoiding any oversight that 
candidates in established parties must contend 
with. Despite strong parties being beneficial 
for democracy, these “independents” have 
little incentive to change the current system 
(Levitsky and Cameron, p. 8). This paradox 
of personal benefit versus democratic benefit 
is exactly what makes parties so important. 
Parties can see beyond individual rewards to 
help democracy as a whole.
 Assuming that Peru’s government is 
motivated to strengthen parties, how could 
it make progress? To answer this question, 
one must first look at the roots of historically 
strong political parties. Parties typically form 
in Latin America during times of great division 
in a country’s history. The most powerful and 
longstanding parties in Colombia, Uruguay, 
and Costa Rica formed in the midst of civil 
wars. Similarly, the political parties of Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Argentina became established 
immediately after changes in voting laws 
created a large influx of new voters. Finally, 
social revolutions in Nicaragua and Bolivia 
resulted in the founding of their parties. 
Without these dramatic events laying the 
foundation for political parties, Latin America 
has seldom seen new parties have long-term 
success (Dargent and Muñoz, p. 65).
 Peru also faces some unique demographic 
and structural challenges in the formation 
of a strong party system. The geographic 
separation between the three regions in 
Peru (desert, Andes, and Amazon) limits 
the capability of national parties to meet the 
needs of each group. Typically, Latin American 
countries are able to form a strong party based 
on the working class. Peru has seen no such 
party form, as the lifestyles and cultures of the 
people in the three regions are not sufficiently 
uniform for common interests to bind them 
together. Also, ongoing citizenship issues 
with indigenous peoples make all forms of 
social inclusion difficult, including voting. 
The indigenous peoples have thus far opted to 
distance themselves from the greater Peruvian 
government rather than participate actively in 
the political system. Appealing to all members 
of the heterogeneous populace is difficult for a 
party.
 Another obstacle to party-building 
efforts in Peru is the lack of institutional 
infrastructure. Before the existence of radio, 
television, and the Internet, politicians had to 
organize large-scale networks to communicate 
with voters (Tanaka, p. 62). They would put a 
major emphasis on building a geographically 
based ground game to rally support. With the 
advent of modern communications systems, 
politicians no longer need to establish these 
community engagement networks because 
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they can communicate through mass media. 
Independent politicians are enabled by these 
readily available modes of communication 
(Dargent and Muñoz, p. 69). Highly structured 
party machinery is not necessary to reach 
voters, and there is little incentive to build 
connections with communities because the 
party may not survive until the next election. In 
this way technological advances have actually 
thwarted progress toward established parties.
 The final impediment to strong political 
parties in Peru is the electoral rules. The 
current system discourages party formation 
through a variety of means. In a presidential 
election, Peruvians directly elect a president 
by a majority of the popular vote. This is the 
simplest method of election and ensures that 
every person’s vote counts equally. But it also 
means that there is no incentive to appeal 
to people living in rural areas (Jackson and 
Moselle, p. 68). Most other countries use 
some form of indirect election, such as an 
electoral college. Voters choose electors who 
then vote for the president. Each region of the 
country is assigned a number of electors, thus 
forcing candidates to appeal to every region as 
opposed to just the major population centers. 
An electoral college incentivizes the creation 
of inroads into regional communities and 
prevents the needs of large geographic areas 
from being ignored. To reach these areas and 
to win the electoral votes of fringe regions, 
significant investment into party infrastructure 
must be made (Jackson and Moselle, p. 73). As 
it stands now, however, in Peru these areas 
are mostly ignored, and parties do not need to 
devote resources to building party roots.
 The Peruvian Congress is also elected based 
on a directly proportional representational 
system (with a few exceptions). Again, seats 
in Congress are not awarded to the winners 
of certain smaller races but are awarded 
proportionally to parties based on popular 
vote. In Peru, the people do not directly vote 
for the seats in Congress but rather vote for 
a party, which then chooses the politician to 
take the seat. This system has an effect similar 
to the direct election of the president in that 
it discourages reaching out to the fringe 
areas of Peruvian society and instead rewards 
parties that focus on population centers. 
The aforementioned d’Hondt method of seat 
allocation means that parties must pass a five-
percent threshold to win any seats. The few 
small parties that have reached out to rural 
Peru seldom pass the five-percent barrier 
and therefore do not gain any seats for their 
efforts. In short, the electoral rules essentially 
disenfranchise large swaths of Peru and 
discourage political participation.
Implications of the 2016 Election
 Several researchers, such as Harvard’s 
Steven Levitsky and Martín Tanaka of The 
Catholic University of Peru, published 
research articles in the early 2000s examining 
the strange party-less government in post-
Fujimori Peru. These researchers evaluated the 
possible paths toward party establishment and 
concluded that there are limited opportunities 
and a bleak outlook. In the 15 years since their 
writing, Peru has mostly confirmed these 
predictions insofar as strong parties have yet 
to form. As a result, Peruvians’ satisfaction 
with democracy is among the lowest in Latin 
America (“Corruption Perceptions Index: 
Peru”). Additionally, a survey conducted 
by the polling agency Americas Barometer 
gauged citizens’ trust in current political 
parties from 2006 until 2014. Over that eight-
year span, trust dropped from 19.4 percent 
trusting political parties to only 9.95 percent, 
the second lowest in Latin America (Cohen). 
This result does not inspire confidence that 
the political party carousel is nearing an end. 
However, there are some positives to take from 
the recent election that may point toward a 
shift. Verónika Mendoza told her supporters to 
vote for PPK in a successful effort to prevent 
Keiko Fujimori from taking office. This is 
by no means an alliance between these two 
parties that have very different ideologies, but 
the fact that it was successful demonstrates an 
increase in party polarization. Extreme dislike 
of one party can serve as a stepping stone to 
coalition building and, eventually, to party 
establishment. Another sign of progress in Peru 
is the strength of Verónika Mendoza’s Broad 
Front party. The political left in Peru has never 
recovered from the atrocities committed by 
the Shining Path. It has been fighting a stigma 
ever since and has never had much success in 
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either presidential or parliamentary elections. 
Former President Ollanta Humala, from 2011 
to 2016, ran on a platform of social inclusion 
but was also fiscally conservative and expanded 
free-market protections. Broad Front is the 
first truly leftist party to win 20 seats or more in 
Congress since 2000. Most stable party systems 
in Latin America have successful parties on 
both ends of the political spectrum. A majority 
of Peru’s political parties have thus far favored 
the right. A successful leftist party will increase 
voter satisfaction with the available options 
and in turn decrease resentment toward the 
political system (Lozada).
 Another indicator of progress from this 
past election is the percentage of blank or 
invalid ballots. Invalid votes are those that 
cannot be counted because of clerical errors on 
the ballot. In countries with mandatory voting 
laws, like Peru, invalid ballots are viewed as 
protest votes and represent dissatisfaction with 
the choices. Peru has one of the highest rates 
of invalid ballots in Latin America (Cohen). 
The rates in Congressional elections and first-
round presidential elections have not changed 
much since 2001, but the invalid ballot rate 
for the second round of presidential elections 
has been steadily dropping, from 11.0 percent 
in 2001 to 5.7 percent in 2016 (“Republic of 
Peru”). In Latin America, there is a correlation 
between how strong the party system is and 
low numbers of invalid ballots. This increase in 
party polarization may help change elections in 
Peru from personally driven to party driven.
Conclusion
 The lack of established political parties has 
not changed much since Fujimori resigned in 
2000. The past 15 years have mostly confirmed 
what many researchers predicted, as strong 
political parties have not emerged. However, 
the elections in 2016 did produce a few results 
that could mean change is coming. The 
emergence of a purely leftist party that had a 
strong candidate in the presidential election 
and that now holds 20 seats in Congress is a 
first in Peruvian politics. This past election also 
displayed a new level of polarization as evidenced 
by Verónika Mendoza’s endorsement of PPK 
because she was so opposed to Keiko Fujimori. 
This trend of heightened party affiliation is also 
demonstrated by the sharp decrease of invalid 
votes in the presidential election. People may 
be beginning to form stronger opinions about 
their choices. This is the first step to these 
parties being able to persist. There are plenty of 
obstacles to party longevity still in place. Direct 
elections, a positive view of independents, and 
citizenship rights issues all pose challenges for 
party establishment. However, this election is 
the first in 15 years to offer any hope of change.
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